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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
The court apparently overlooked an additional reason for holding the
communications in question privileged. The defendant's counsel was admitted
to practice before the United States District Court of New York to represent
his employer in litigation; and the documents in question were directly con-
nected with that action. It is submitted that admission to litigate a case before
any recognized and established court of law should be sufficient to qualify
counsel as attorney within the scope of the attorney-client privilege for
communications directly connected with that action.' 4
JOHN MICHAEL NILLES
INSURANCE-EXTENT OF LIABILITY-RECOVERY IN ABSENCE OF PECUNIAnY
Loss.-Plaintiff, insured, sued defendant, insurer, to recover for a loss su-
stained under a fire insurance policy issued by defendant. The plaintiff
occupied the insured premises as lessee, the terms of the lease providing that
the lessor would repair any damage to the premises resulting from fire. The
contract of insurance between plaintiff and defendant provided that for the
purposes of that agreement, the plaintiff was to be considered the sole and
unconditional owner. Shortly after the loss suffered under the policy, the
lessor repaired the damaged premises pursuant to the terns of the lease. It was
held that the defendant's liability attached on the happening of the loss and
that subsequent restoration without cost to the plaintiff did not relieve the
defendant of its accrued liability. Citizens Insurance Company v. Foxbilt,
Inc., 226 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1955).
The question of whether an insured may recover when he has suffered no
pecuniary loss is one of controversy. Fire insurance is generally considered
to be a personal contract.' The weight of authority requires that there be an
insurable interest, 2 and that actual pecuniary loss be sustained,3 before there
can be recovery. Generally, a tenant is said to have an insurable interest in
the leasehold. 4 It has frequently been stated by the courts that one may not
make a profit on fire insurance. 5 The rule in England is that the insured is
considered to have suffered no loss when a person under a contract duty to
repair has made good the damage. 6 It is argued in support of the above
position that public policy demands such a result to prevent "wagering con-
tracts" and the intentional destruction of property.
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RECENT CASES
The court in the principal case, following the so-called New York rule,"
points out that the defendant contracted to consider the plaintiff as the un-
conditional owner, and from that contract arose a primary liability to the
plaintiff." This liability was said to attach at the happening of the loss. The
defendant, through the receipt of premiums, was compensated for acceptence
of the risk of loss and if it was now excused from liability it would seem that
the defendant would be the recipient of a windfall.' 0 The fact that the third-
party lessor also assumed the risk of loss, in consideration of increased rent
receipts, does not effect the defendant's liability. 1 1 It is a general principle
that parties to an insurance contract may provide any rights and obligations
thereunder,1" which are not unreasonable, illegal, or contrary to public policy.13
It appears from the decision in the principle case that the desire for freedom
in contracting is lending some courts to ignore public policy restrictions.' 4
While the instant case is not criticizable in its application of the law,
double recovery should be avoided. In the mortgagee insurance cases, after
the insurer has paid the mortgagee, the latter's claim against the mortgagor
passes by subrogation to the insurer.1 5 By analogy, it may be reasoned that
in situations such as the principal case presents, the Lessee's contract right
against the Lessor should pass to the insurer. 16 It has also been suggested that
the doctrine of contribution be extended to apply to the third-party obligor
and the insurer.'7
It may be inferred from a decision's and a statute19 that North Dakota
follows the majority view in considering insurance to be for indemnity from
actual loss only. If a similar fact situation were presented to the courts of
this state, their holding would probably be contrary to the instant decision.
As an equitable solution in such a case, it is suggested that the insurance policy
be considered void because there was no risk, thus entitling the insured to
restitution of the premiums paid.
RUDOLPH R. RAGER
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